Echoes of the Past: The Failure of NATO Expansion

Formed in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (commonly referred to as NATO) was formed by the United States and eleven European countries. Since then, the alliance has expanded to include a total of 30 countries, with the vast majority of new members coming from Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, Albania, Croatia, and Hungary. The growth of the organization has come in waves since a few additional states were added in the 50s. In 1999, three Central European countries were added. In 2004, 7 Eastern European countries were added. In 2009, two more were added from Eastern Europe, with an additional two since then. NATO is appealing to these states because of Article 5 of the treaty’s founding document, which states that “an armed attack against one or more of them [member countries] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” This guarantee of mutual defense has made joining NATO an aspiration for many countries in Eastern Europe, such as Ukraine who have feared Russian aggression since the fall of the Soviet Union. This presents a difficult predicament for NATO and its biggest contributor, the United States. What role does the United States have in defending Eastern Europe? Ultimately, the expansion of NATO was fundamentally antagonistic to Russia, which has in turn made the safety of Eastern Europe more precarious.

Early Errors

The first misstep in the expansion of NATO into central and Eastern Europe came in 1990 when Secretary of State James Baker told the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand past the forthcoming reunified German border. While this was never put into a written agreement, it did set the expectations for the Soviet Union and the succeeding Russian Federation as to NATO’s plans. The real misrepresentation of Baker’s promise came under the Clinton administration several years later. In October of 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher proposed a “Partnership for Peace” open to all states in Europe, which Russian President Boris Yeltsin was satisfied with, because, as he explicitly notes, it would be a “partnership for all not a membership to some” regarding NATO. Russian leadership at the time was concerned that an expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe could ostracize their country from the rest of Europe, which Yeltsin also mentioned in his meeting with Christopher. Christopher did not know that in the long-term, the partnership could be a jumping off point for NATO membership. 

The Partnership for Peace included Russia in its future plans for European security. This was arguably a win-win scenario, in which the U.S. and its NATO allies would be able to expand their influence in Eastern Europe while keeping Russia involved and avoiding tensions. However, the Partnership for Peace did not pan out according to Russian expectations. 

President Clinton, while speaking with President Vaclav Havel of the Czech Republic, noted that Partnership for Peace was seen as a track to membership for Central and Eastern European Countries (not including Russia). Russia eventually heard that U.S. foreign policy leaders were beginning to discuss the logistics and reasons for expanding NATO. This led to Boris Yeltsin at the 1994 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe summit in Budapest, following the outlined conditions for joining NATO being released, accusing NATO of “sowing seeds of mistrust” and creating a “cold peace” in Europe by looking to expand NATO. The U.S. made it clear just a year prior that the Partnership for Peace was the primary focus for European security and that NATO membership was a long term possibility. In just a year, the U.S. had begun to lay out NATO membership qualifications. To Russia, especially Vladimir Putin, this qualified as deception. 

Russia’s Fears

In his speech on February 21st, Russian President Vladimir Putin made note of both the promises to Gorbachev and Yeltsin on the expansion of NATO as examples of deception by the West. Some people may write this off as a reach at justifying the invasion of Ukraine. However, history shows that the expansion of NATO has been a problem for Russia since it began in the 90s, and Americans were able to recognize this concern. Arguably the most notable American diplomat of the 20th Century, George Kennan, who famously devised the Cold War Strategy of containment, wrote an article in the New York Times criticizing the expansion of NATO. He called the expansion of NATO “the most fateful error in American foreign policy” post-Cold War, because it could “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion,” as NATO expansion would be seen as an insult and threat to security. These concerns are not purely prideful on Russia’s part, but are rooted in genuine security issues. In a 2009 memorandum released by Wikileaks, which has since been deleted, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice notes to the U.S. Ambassador to Russia William J. Burns that Russia’s concern with Ukraine joining NATO stems from the existence of an ethnic-Russian population in Ukraine which could potentially lead to a civil war in Ukraine on the border with Russia. 

Whether or not Russia was justified in its concerns over NATO expansion, what matters is that they were concerned with it and saw it as a threat to their national security. If that was the case, then was it truly wise for the United States to push for the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe? Russia has reacted adversely to governments that aspired for NATO membership, such as Georgia and Ukraine, invading both countries. Had NATO not expanded, the threat of these countries being invaded would have been significantly lower. If the election of reform-minded presidents or democratically motivated revolutions makes Russia feel threatened that NATO will be on their border, necessitating drastic action to prevent an adversarial alliance from surrounding them, is NATO really securing Eastern European countries? Certainly, Russia ought to have refrained from military action in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. But when NATO promised not to expand, then provided an alternative route for security, then expanded anyway in spite of Russian concerns, it is understandable why Russia would feel threatened. 

The U.S. foreign policy establishment ignored Russian concerns regarding NATO expansion, resulting in insecurity in Eastern Europe. Dumping the Partnership for Peace and moving forward with the expansion of NATO was a slap in the face to Russia. In doing so, the U.S. and NATO placed themselves in a threatening position to Russia, who with each wave of NATO expansion found themselves surrounded by an alliance that had lied to and ignored them. Thus, Russia invaded countries on their border that could have potentially joined NATO. Some may say that Russia would have invaded Ukraine regardless of NATO expansion, but as the memorandum from William Burns notes, NATO expansion into Ukraine and Georgia were primary concerns of Russia. The only two countries which Russia has invaded on its border were ones that were poised to join NATO. Timing is also important, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was elected in 2019, and subsequently advocated for joining NATO, just over two years prior to the invasion.

In Closing

Expanding NATO was clearly a misstep in U.S. foreign policy. Along the way, there were several ways in which the U.S. could have avoided giving Russia the sense that it was cornered. Had the Partnership for Peace remained in place, Russia would have been content. If Russia was more involved in the expansion of NATO, with its concern better attended to, perhaps its feelings towards NATO would not have been so antagonistic. Instead the U.S. and NATO pushed for expansion, disregarding more diplomatic paths. With the war in Ukraine continuing to take thousands of lives, who can truly say that expanding NATO made Eastern Europe more safe?