Not So Sweet Cherry Pie: Against Desire Satisfactionism

Fundamentally, we strive to lead a good life, whether that means adhering to a set of universal principles and goals or choosing a more individualized path. Conceptualizations of welfare commonly are delineated into objective and subjective theories. Objective theories explicitly define intrinsic goods regardless of individual attitudes towards those things, while subjective theories take into account the role of attitude in determining intrinsic goods. One version of subjective theory –Chris Heathwood’s “desire satisfactionism”– demands special consideration. Desire satisfactionism is built upon the idea that the only thing that is intrinsically good for a person is the fulfillment of that individual’s desires. Heathwood expounds the welfare theory of desire satisfactionism in his paper “Faring Well and Getting What You Want,” arguing that in order for welfare to be attained, two clauses must hold: an individual’s desires must be actually satisfied and that individual must be aware of that desire being satisfied. I argue that the awareness clause of Heathwood’s argument is inconsistent because certain cases make its fulfillment irrelevant in achieving the same amount of welfare.

Desire Satisfactionism

Heathwood begins his argument by rejecting objective theories of welfare. He clarifies that intrinsic goods, or the “things [that] make us better off in themselves” must be “something [someone] wants, likes, or cares about” in order for that thing to truly benefit that person. Heathwood counters the objection to the subjectivist theory that it is “possible for a person to want, like, or care about getting the wrong things” by arguing that Ted Bundy benefitted from his lifestyle in the years leading up to his arrest. Although Bundy’s actions were morally reprehensible, his lifestyle did make him “better off” given his personal desires. Thus, caring for deplorable things increased Bundy’s welfare, affirming the subjective theory. 

The second component of Heathwood’s argument elucidates a subjective theory, namely desire satisfactionism. Since subjectivists base welfare on attitudes, a desire may be defined as a special positive attitude that when satisfied, results in the attainment of welfare. Inversely, “whenever a person’s desires are frustrated, this constitutes a basic harm.” According to Heathwood, these are the only sources of benefit and harm. Heathwood clarifies that desires are things that genuinely appeal to us, not the behavioral sense of wanting the things that we do. The distinction here pertains to what we think we may want versus our more immediate, system-one-driven, desires. Heathwood also notes that hedonism (the subjective theory that the attainment of pleasure leads to welfare) can be explained by desire satisfactionism because pleasure is one positive attitude that can be explained as a desire to experience a sensation. Once satisfied (i.e., the sensation is experienced), this desire increases an individual’s welfare. In essence, Heathwood’s definition of desire satisfactionism entails two components: one’s desires must be satisfied and one must be aware that these desires have been satisfied.

The problem with Heathwood’s argument lies in the second component: that an individual must be aware of their desire being satisfied to benefit fully from its satisfaction. Heathwood provides two hypothetical scenarios that contradict one another in terms of this awareness clause. As such, this clause is not fully applicable to desire satisfactionism, and thus should not be considered an absolute condition of the theory.

The purpose of Heathwood’s first hypothetical scenario is to strengthen his response to the objectivist’s critique regarding an individual desiring things that are bad for them. Heathwood invites one to consider an individual desiring to eat a cherry pie not being aware that they have developed an allergy to cherries. If this desire is satisfied, the individual is not better off because the welfare derived from eating the pie is outweighed by the negative allergic reaction. This scenario gives rise to the postulate that desires are idealized, not actual. In this scenario, this means that the desire to not have an allergic reaction ultimately trumps the desire to eat the pie. Yet, the individual is not aware of this higher-order desire which would result in a greater net benefit. Additionally, the overall desired result is more important than the satisfaction of the immediate desire.

The other hypothetical example that Heathwood offers produces the aforementioned awareness clause. Heathwood illustrates a story of an uncle in exile, with his nephew better off when he knows that his uncle is well. Desire satisfactionism can accommodate this scenario because it includes desires about an individual’s own life, even in the case that one’s life is impacted by the relative state of another’s. Heathwood provides slight variation to address this issue by stating that “in order to be benefitted, we must be aware that the desired event has occurred, or is occurring.” This slightly looser restriction allows for individuals to desire occurrences outside of themselves, such as a sports team making the playoffs or an artist winning a Grammy Award, as long as they know that the event actually occurred. In the case of the uncle in exile, this clause holds: the nephew is made better off if he is aware that his uncle is actually doing well, as compared to merely thinking that his uncle is doing well.

Inconsistent Terms

However, in the cherry pie example, the individual had no awareness of the existence of the allergy. In not eating the pie, they would also not be aware that the higher desire of not suffering an allergic reaction was fulfilled, even unconsciously. If Heathwood’s awareness clause were applied in this scenario, not eating the pie would not constitute an increase in welfare. This is due to the fact that the individual would not be aware of their desire to not have an allergic reaction because they would not yet be aware of the possibility of the reaction occurring in the first place. Yet as Heathwood states, the fulfillment of the idealized desire (not having an allergic reaction) results in that individual being better off. In other words, while the awareness clause holds in the case of the uncle in exile, it does not apply to the cherry pie case. 

It is vital to consider the limitations of human cognition to better understand why this clause cannot hold in every scenario. Take, for instance, a hypothetical case of two individuals with a desire to be connected to a spiritual power. One individual grows up in a secular community and household not knowing about the existence of religion and living in ignorance to any idealized desire of being religious. However, this individual’s desire to be religious or spiritually connected to a higher power is their strongest idealized desire. The other individual grows up in a secular household in a very religious community, desiring strongly to join that religious community. Both individuals simultaneously happen to encounter and embed themselves in a religious environment independently while traveling to another country. Upon this event, both individuals have fulfilled their desires to the same degree, but the first individual may wrongly attribute their newfound religiosity to a different desire (e.g., seeking out new friendships and relationships) or to no desire at all (i.e., religiosity occurred by happenstance). If the awareness clause were to hold in this case, the individual who grew up consciously knowing that they desired to be religious should be better off because they are explicitly aware that their desire to join a religion has been fulfilled. This is not the case. The individual with the idealized desire may even perhaps be better off because they did not expect to find such spiritual fulfillment by chance. This scenario underscores the relevance of cognitive restrictions in being aware of our desires being fulfilled, as these restrictions do not necessarily impact the resulting welfare.

No Absolutes

At this juncture, it is important to address the two different types of awareness at play: awareness of a desire’s existence and awareness of a desire occurring. Heathwood’s definition only calls for the second to be fulfilled. Yet, as we have seen in these two cases of cherry pie and religion, neither awareness was fulfilled, but the individuals were still better off. Perhaps the relevance of the latter awareness is dependent on the presence of the former. Regardless, my point is simply that the latter does not hold in all cases, so it cannot be absolute to Heathwood’s definition of desire satisfactionism.

It is also important to clarify that the inconsistency of Heathwood’s awareness clause between these hypothetical situations does not wholly negate the validity of the argument that awareness of a desire being satisfied contributes to an increase in welfare. It is true in the case of the uncle, as well as many other cases, that wellbeing is increased further with complete awareness of a desire being satisfied. However, since this clause cannot be applied to every scenario, it cannot be an absolute condition of Heathwood’s theory.