The Failure of International Organizations
How to Better Predict and Prevent International Atrocities
Remembering the Rwandan Genocide (The UN African Renewal, 2021)
Introduction
Historically, the international community has struggled to predict and combat mass atrocities and genocides. Whether it be the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II and the Holocaust to the United Nations’ futile attempts to protect Rwandan civilians during the Rwandan genocide, there has been a severe lack of effective action regarding international organizations preventing the mass evils of the world. It need not be this way, however. Certain strengths can be developed and honed by the international community, particularly the reinforcing and restructuring of international aid and organizations, the adoption of a more realist viewpoint, and, crucially, greater attention paid to domestic warning signs which could all serve to predict and thus prevent mass atrocities through preemptive intervention.
Prevention Strategy #1: Strengthening and Restructuring International Organizations
In their current state, international organizations cannot effectively combat mass atrocities and genocides. To a certain extent, it is due to the very nature of international organizations. For instance, the United Nations (UN for short) is meant to combat international anarchy and promote collective security, or states should join together to protect themselves from threats. However, this strategy truly only works for states that abide by their rules and governance, and even then, groups like the UN lack much power to alter countries’ behaviors effectively. Take, for instance, the ongoing internment of Uyghur Muslims in China, which has been described as geo-strategical and Islamophobic genocide. The UN and the global community are aware of this ongoing conflict, and yet all the most powerful countries such as the United States of America can do is condemn the concentration camps and the actions of China and establish tariffs on certain Chinese companies. However, economic sanctions and condemnations do not have sticking power. The cited author, Ali Çaksu, wrote hopefully in 2020 that the Uyghur genocide will have a happy ending soon. Four years later, the genocide continues, with no end in sight and little involvement from the UN. They cannot get further involved either—after all, China is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and can veto any movement regarding the Uyghur genocide. A restructuring and strengthening of the UN, therefore, is in order if it wants to aid the Uyghur Muslims in China.
Yet the structure of international organizations is not the only issue they face, as their own actions also present difficulties. One predominant problem with international organizations is that peacekeeping involvement mostly occurs once a conflict has already begun, and this can have devastating consequences. On a broad scale, peacekeeping once a conflict begins can actually spur on violence directed toward civilians, due to the third-party challenges to a ruling party’s power and control over a territory and populace. There is also a “moral hazard” in humanitarian intervention, which is when intervention allows for violent rebellions to succeed, encouraging additional, more violent revolts and thus leading to more conflict and genocide. These moral hazards are often ignored when trying to aid war-torn countries, and thus reform is necessary. Moreover, military endeavors are often offensive, seeking to target strategic goals aggressively rather than protect vulnerable areas. Taken altogether, it is clear that humanitarian aid needs to be restructured and strengthened to focus on preemptive action toward prevention instead of simply response.
The Rwandan Genocide is an infamous example of failed peacekeeping amid an ongoing conflict. During the genocide, peacekeepers lacked the force and the orders necessary to protect the civilian population. Possibly one million Tutsi and Tutsi-sympathetic Rwandans were murdered by the Hutu-led government, even with the involvement of over 2500 United Nations peacekeepers. The UN did not formally condemn the violence as “genocide” until 2014, exactly twenty years after the conflict ended in 1994, and even during it, the UN allowed peacekeepers to “take action in self-defense against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, the UN and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief” only after the violence against citizens had hit its maximum. This is vital. The peacekeepers lacked any actual ability to intervene in the conflict until after most civilian deaths occurred, and that is unacceptable if the international community wants to work to save lives.
Prevention Strategy #2: Adopt a Realist Viewpoint
So, how can the international community work toward preventive action? As it stands, the international community is rooted in liberalism. Whether it be the collective security ventures of the United Nations or the international trade regulations of the World Trade Organization, global institutions are predominantly based on cooperation. However, genocidal leaders and warmongers do not think in terms of cooperation and liberalism. Power expansion and maintenance are bloody affairs, rooted in offensive realism, and the power expansion of genocidal leaders is the same. As such, international organizations cannot base their understanding of the world on liberalism. Mass atrocities and genocides often do not get stopped once they start until the attackers are militarily overpowered, as seen in the Vietnam War with the American defeat, the Holocaust with the German defeat, and the Rwandan genocide with the defeat of the Hutu government by the Rwandan Patriotic Front. To prevent civilian casualties, the fact must be understood that countries waging war or committing atrocities often do not seek liberal diplomacy or cooperation. They are realist, and thus the international community needs to respond in turn, with military action.
This does not mean that the international community needs to seek out war intentionally or be intentionally offensive. On the contrary, simply understanding that states tend toward violence, particularly when expanding power, is a vital step toward peace. As mentioned, military strategies are often rooted in offense instead of defense, which only exacerbates tensions. By rooting military endeavors in defense instead, preparing for inevitable conflict instead of either seeking cooperation or conflict itself, the international community can better protect the vulnerable against mass killings and genocides. The recognition of the realist behavior of these genocidal leaders, however, is the vital first step.
Prevention Strategy #3: Pay Attention to Warning Signs
Of the discussed strategies, this third and final issue is by far the most critical and realistic. Genocides do not spawn from thin air, and mass atrocities do not just exist in a vacuum. For instance, states with low infant mortality rates, histories of discrimination, and no membership with the GATT or WTO are more likely to commit mass killings. Furthermore, wartime, and particularly governmental wartime losses, are linked to a greater chance of genocidal and atrocious behavior as an “internal enemy” is defined and violence is legitimized. If warfare and genocide are examined as dynamic models, where individual and contingent choices are made, genocide is often not the first choice for most leaders. Rather, it is a response to failure, contingencies, and opponent actions. By observing a dynamic model, wherein states do not simply commit atrocities but there exists a series of events that leads up to them, the international community has a better chance at preemptively involving itself to prevent the atrocities in the first place, rather than simply trying to mitigate the atrocities once they have already begun.
One key example of where the international community could have better-observed warning signs would be the most famous and atrocious genocide in history: the Holocaust. Indeed, Germany displayed quite a lot of warning signs about the genocide and war that it would start which the international community collectively ignored. P. M. H. Bell underscores two historical events as critical to the repowering of Germany, both of which center around countries overlooking or underestimating Germany and her allies. The first was the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932-1934, which distracted the rest of Europe in discussing rearmament as an issue, allowing Germany to covertly restore power and rearm covertly. The second was the unopposed German occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland, in which France had the chance to oppose and defeat Germany militarily but refused to do so due to its own instability and reluctance to initiate conflict. Germany’s remilitarization was overlooked throughout the 1930s, and it was this empowering of the German troops that let it wreak havoc throughout Europe during World War II. Germany became the strongest European power by the end of 1937. The League of Nations did not prevent it from doing so, nor did any of Germany’s contemporary or potential enemies. Had the international community paid attention to these warning signs, it is possible that intervention could have prevented the Holocaust, and the international community needs to learn from this mistake lest more preventable genocides occur.
An Infringement on Liberty?
These recommendations, however, come with caveats. It is a slippery slope between preventing genocide and deciding for another country what an external power thinks is best. Given the fact that most genocides occur in weak countries, it is a risky business for a powerful Global North country to begin demanding that it knows said weaker country’s political and social situation best, for it could easily devolve into neo-colonialism. Indeed, genocide is inherently linked to colonization and empire, and efforts to reestablish historical colonial ties, regardless of how well-intentioned they are, could either worsen existing conflicts or provoke new atrocities (thus the moral hazard argument from before). As such, care must be taken to affirm that defensive militarization is primarily utilized and that all warning signs are properly understood. The international community cannot afford to falter, but it also cannot make mere guesses and flawed judgments. A balance must be struck.
Conclusion
Strengthening and restructuring global organizations, adopting a realist viewpoint, and relentlessly watching out for warning signs are some of the potential strategies that the international community could adopt to protect victims of atrocities better before said atrocities can occur. Certainly, this is an oversimplification, but it is not enough to be reactionary. Prevention must be at the forefront of international thought to best neutralize genocide. With these three strategies, and especially the better observation of warning signs, it is very possible that the United Nations and other international organizations could both end existing atrocities and prevent new ones, avoiding a repeat of Rwanda, Armenia, Bosnia, Cambodia, and so many more. The international community can prevent the past from turning into the future, and that is worth as much effort as we can muster.